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Preslar v. Commissioner:  
Debt-Discharge Income and Its Rationale 
I. INTRODUCTION 
How taxpayers determine the amount of money on which they 
must pay taxes is an uneasy question because this amount, gross in-
come, has never been conclusively defined. Neither the Internal 
Revenue Code (“I.R.C.” or “Code”) nor the courts have ever ex-
actly defined the concept,1 largely because the inquiry into what con-
stitutes gross income involves numerous conceptual uncertainties. 
One of these uncertainties revolves around “[i]ncome from discharge 
of indebtedness.”2 The general notion of debt-discharge income 
(that a taxpayer recognizes a benefit and, therefore, must recognize 
income when a debt is forgiven because the taxpayer will not have to 
repay the debt) is relatively uncontroversial. However, there is con-
siderable difficulty surrounding both the actual reasoning behind the 
rule and, more specifically, an exception to the rule that allows non-
inclusion if the original amount of the debt is uncertain. 
In the case of Preslar v. Commissioner, the Tenth Circuit exam-
ined this “disputed debt” exception in depth and came to a conclu-
sion directly at odds with preexisting Third Circuit authority.3 This 
Note analyzes these opposing conclusions and ultimately suggests 
that this split arises because the two circuits interpret the underlying 
logic of debt discharge income differently. Part II more thoroughly 
introduces the concept of debt-discharge income and examines the 
disputed debt exception to the general rule. Part III examines the 
facts of the Preslar case and summarizes the Tenth Circuit’s reason-
ing. Part IV analyzes the court’s reasoning in the context of how the 
rationale for debt-discharge income should affect the disputed debt 
exception and critiques the Tenth Circuit’s application of the excep-
tion to the facts of the Preslar case. Finally, Part V concludes that the 
Preslar court correctly analyzed the concepts of debt-discharge in-
 
 1. See 26 U.S.C. § 61 (1994); United States v. Gotcher, 401 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 
1968); James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961). 
 2. § 61(a)(12). 
 3. See Preslar v. Commissioner, 167 F.3d 1323 (10th Cir. 1999). 
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come and the disputed debt exception but incorrectly applied those 
concepts to the facts of the Preslar case. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Gross Income 
When Great Britain first considered the adoption of an income 
tax, economists differed as to what amount should constitute a tax 
base.4 Based on the ideal that people should be taxed according to 
their standard of living, some favored taxing personal consumption.5 
Others thought that people should be taxed according to their abil-
ity to pay and favored taxing wealth.6 For a variety of reasons, an in-
come tax was seen as a good way to attain both of these goals.7 
Still, “income” had to be defined. The “Schanz-Haig-Simons” 
theory attempts to do this.8 Although the theory does not explicitly 
appear anywhere in the I.R.C., this concept roughly describes the tax 
system’s view of gross income.9 In essence, it asserts that “an indi-
vidual’s income for a given period (usually a year) equals any net in-
crease in her wealth (or minus any net decrease in her wealth) plus 
the market value of her consumption during the year.”10 Though the 
concepts of consumption and wealth change may seem easily com-
prehensible, both can be quite difficult to accurately ascertain. For 
example, consumption literally means any type of satisfaction, 
whether psychological or material; under this strict interpretation, a 
taxpayer’s gross income should include both tangible and intangible 
benefits including, for instance, the enjoyment he receives from lis-
tening to birds sing.11 Clearly, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) 
 
 4. See JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, 
AND POLICY 30 (2d ed. 1999). 
 5. See id. at 30–31. 
 6. See id. at 31. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See id. 
 9. See id. 
 10. Id. The federal income tax system gets to this amount, more or less, by including all 
current year receipts less any business and investment deductions. Because the nondeductible 
receipts must either be consumed or saved, this approach carries out the Schanz-Haig-Simons 
concept. See id. at 34–35. 
 11. See Daniel Shaviro, The Man Who Lost Too Much: Zarin v. Commissioner and the 
Measurement of Taxable Consumption, 45 TAX L. REV. 215, 224 (1990). 
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could not feasibly administer this interpretation. Instead, the IRS has 
chosen to value consumption objectively by only assessing a tax on 
the amount the taxpayer initially pays for consumption.12 This prac-
tice helps, in large part, to simplify the tax system, and the concep-
tual tax base may again seem simple to compute. However, taxpayers 
engage in so many varied transactions that deciding whether a par-
ticular transaction is consumption or an increase in wealth or neither 
is very difficult. 
The Supreme Court touched upon these difficulties in Commis-
sioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.,13 a seminal case on the question of gross 
income. In Glenshaw, the Supreme Court had to determine whether 
a taxpayer who received a large award of exemplary damages had to 
include this “windfall” in gross income.14 Feeling compelled to use a 
“liberal construction”15 in applying the 1939 Code (the predecessor 
to the current code), the Court held that the windfall must, indeed, 
be included in gross income.16 In so holding, the Court implicitly 
overruled an earlier, narrower interpretation of gross income in favor 
of this inclusive catch-all definition of “all gains except those specifi-
cally exempted.”17 
Understanding that the Court has approached the difficulties of 
defining gross income with a wide mandate of inclusion is important 
because it colors how courts look at all aspects of the system. With 
such broad ideals as consumption and wealth, many questions can 
and do arise, and the courts have great leeway in interpreting and 
deciding these questions. The Supreme Court’s decision in Glenshaw 
had an umbrella effect over every ambiguous aspect of the system, 
 
 12. See id. at 225. The IRS accomplishes this, not by determining what everyone paid 
for everything, but by not allowing taxpayers to deduct from their gross income these types of 
expenses. For example, assume Jack makes $10,000 a year. He has business expenses totaling 
$1000. He has personal expenses totaling $5000 (spent on all the things people buy for their 
personal lives). The IRS does not require Jack to keep track of every personal expense so that 
they know how much to tax him (clearly, an administratively daunting task); instead the IRS 
requires Jack to include all $10,000 of his income, then allows deductions only for business 
expenses. Personal expenses are treated as a matter of nondeduction. See DODGE ET AL., supra 
note 4, at 53–54. 
 13. See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955). 
 14. See id. at 427, 429. 
 15. Id. at 430. 
 16. See id. at 429 (“This Court has frequently stated that. . .[the language defining gross 
income] was used by Congress to exert . . . ‘the full measure of its taxing power.’” (quoting 
Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940))). 
 17. Id. at 430; see also DODGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 62. 
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instructing the courts to broadly enforce the tax code, instead of nar-
rowly interpreting it.18 
B. Debt-Discharge Income 
Even before the Court adopted Glenshaw’s broad approach, it 
decided that taxpayers must include the amount of a discharged debt 
in gross income.19 In United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., the Su-
preme Court held that if a “‘corporation purchases and retires 
any . . . bonds at a price less than the issuing price or face value, the 
excess of the issuing price . . . over the purchase price is . . . income 
for the taxable year.’”20 The Court apparently limited the scope of its 
holding by stating that Kirby Lumber Company had to include the 
amount of reduced debt in its gross income because the reduction of 
debt had “made available . . . assets previously offset by the obliga-
tion of bonds now extinct.”21 This language suggested that debt-
discharge income had to be included only “to the extent that it freed 
the borrower’s assets.”22 
This “freed assets” justification for debt-discharge income seems 
rather intuitive. At the beginning of the transaction, loan proceeds 
were encumbered and did not realistically belong to the taxpayer; as 
such, he did not have to include them in gross income.23 In hind-
sight, after the debt discharge, the loan proceeds are free and clear, 
 
 18. In Glenshaw, the Court recognized that Congress had “applied no limitations as to 
the source of taxable receipts.” 348 U.S. at 429. As such, the Court felt compelled to recog-
nize congressional intent and give wide latitude as to what items should be included in gross 
income. See id. at 430. 
 19. See United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931). At the time of Kirby, 
before Glenshaw, the Court did construe debt-discharge income a bit more narrowly than they 
now do. The Court cited an earlier case, Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170 
(1926), for the proposition that a transaction could yield debt-discharge income only if the 
whole transaction was not a loss. Kerbaugh-Empire, however, has been largely discredited and 
a transaction can now yield debt-discharge income even though the transaction as a whole 
yielded a loss. See William Helburn, Inc. v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 815, 819 (1st Cir. 1954) 
(stating that Kerbaugh-Empire is a “frequently criticized . . . decision.”); DODGE ET AL., supra 
note 4, at 137 (“[T]he taxpayer [is not] asked (as suggested by the Kerbaugh Empire case. . .) 
if the borrowed money is still wholly ‘intact . . . .’”). 
 20. 284 U.S. at 3 (quoting Article 545(1)(c) of Regulations 62, under Revenue Act of 
1921). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Gregory M. Giangiordano, Taxation—Discharge of Indebtedness Income—Zarin v. 
Commissioner, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 1189, 1192 (1991). 
 23. See DODGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 133. 
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and the taxpayer can do anything he wants with them. It seems clear 
that he should now include the “newly acquired assets” in his gross 
income. 
The Supreme Court, though, in Commissioner v. Tufts, seemed 
to move away from the freed assets justification.24 In Tufts, the tax-
payer owned property that was subject to a nonrecourse mortgage 
(an obligation for which he was not personally liable).25 The taxpayer 
transferred the property to a buyer, and the buyer assumed the non-
recourse debt.26 The Court held that the taxpayer realized income 
equal to the amount of the discharged mortgage.27 The Court did 
not look at whether the discharge freed any of the taxpayer’s assets; 
instead, it focused on the symmetry28 of the loan transaction.29 The 
Court reasoned that the taxpayer did not have to pay taxes on the 
original loan because the government assumed that he would even-
tually repay the debt using after-tax dollars.30 The Court further rea-
soned that, if the government’s prediction proved incorrect (the tax-
payer ended up not repaying the obligation), the taxpayer would 
have “effectively . . . received untaxed income at the time the loan 
was extended.”31 So, when it becomes clear that a taxpayer is not go-
ing to repay the debt (in other words, when it becomes clear that the 
taxpayer received untaxed income), the IRS is allowed to remedy this 
error by taxing the amount of unpaid debt as income. It does not 
matter whether the taxpayer discharged a recourse mortgage or a 
nonrecourse mortgage (an action that would not free up assets be-
cause the taxpayer was never personally liable for the debt); what 
matters is that the IRS’s treatment of the back end of the transaction 
should be consistent with its treatment of the front end of the trans-
action. 
 
 
 24. See 461 U.S. 300 (1983); Shaviro, supra note 11, at 218. 
 25. See 461 U.S. at 302. 
 26. See id. at 303. 
 27. See id. at 308–09. The decision is more complicated than just that: income is not 
wholly defined by the amount of the mortgage discharge, and the case also deals with issues 
concerning how the income is recognized. For our purposes, though, the case stands for the 
proposition that discharge of nonrecourse debt can result in income to the taxpayer. See 
DODGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 168–70. 
 28. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 29. See Tufts, 461 U.S. at 309–10. 
 30. See id. at 307. 
 31. Id. at 310. 
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Tufts changed the rationale for debt-discharge income. No 
longer is a debt discharge included in income only when it frees as-
sets. Under Tufts, all debt discharge becomes income when the debt 
was originally excluded from income. This shift does not destroy the 
concept of the disputed debt exception. However, it does change the 
basis for the concept, and that change has a very real effect on the 
application of the rule and its exceptions. 
C. The Disputed-Debt Exception 
In N. Sobel, Inc. v. Commissioner, the United States Board of Tax 
Appeals created an exception to the concept of debt-discharge in-
come.32 In Sobel, a corporation bought one hundred shares of stock 
from its bank with a note of credit.33 When the note came due, the 
corporation refused to pay and brought suit, demanding rescission of 
the note and judgment for the interest paid.34 The corporation 
claimed that the transaction was illegal and that the bank had failed 
to live up to its duties; the parties settled for half the original amount 
of the note.35 The IRS contended that the corporation had to in-
clude the half that had been settled away in its gross income.36 The 
court held that, since there was “question . . . as to . . . [the tax-
payer’s] liability and the amount thereof,” the IRS could not defini-
tively say that the discharge had actually freed any of the taxpayer’s 
assets.37 In other words, until the settlement, the debt “was not ac-
tual and present by any practical test.”38 Since the amount of debt 
was unknown, the taxpayer could not be taxed on a forgiveness of it. 
Under the freeing of assets test, a debt is sufficiently “in dispute” 
if it is either unenforceable or unliquidated (the actual amount of the 
original debt is unknown). After all, one cannot free an already-freed 
asset—if the debt was always unenforceable, the asset was always free. 
 
 32. See 40 B.T.A. 1263, 1265 (1939). Though this case was decided before the Su-
preme Court adopted the symmetry rationale, the exception survives today. See Zarin v. Com-
missioner, 916 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1990). However, it is my contention that the shift in ration-
ale for the inclusion of debt-discharge income should be accompanied by a shift in the 
rationale and, hence, the application of the disputed debt exception. 
 33. See 40 B.T.A. at 1264. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See id. 
 36. See id. 
 37. Id. at 1265. 
 38. Id. 
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The Third Circuit, in Zarin v. Commissioner, applied the freeing of 
assets test to an unenforceable debt.39 In this case, Zarin had run up 
considerable debt to a casino; under state law, however, the debt was 
unenforceable.40 The casino and Zarin eventually settled their debt 
out of court for an amount considerably lower than what Zarin actu-
ally owed.41 The IRS contended that this represented debt-discharge 
income. Zarin claimed that, because he disputed the debt, the dis-
puted-debt exception applied and he did not have to include the dis-
charged amount in gross income. The IRS countered that the excep-
tion applied only to an unliquidated debt.42 The Third Circuit 
explicitly rejected the IRS’s position and held that, “[w]hen a debt is 
unenforceable, it follows that the amount of the debt, and not just 
the liability thereon, is in dispute.”43 
The Tenth Circuit’s decision in Preslar created a split on this 
point.44 In Preslar, the Tenth Circuit rejected Zarin and stated that 
“[t]o implicate the [disputed debt] . . . doctrine, the original amount 
of the debt must be unliquidated.”45 Thus, the Third Circuit will in-
voke the disputed-debt exception when the original debt is either 
unenforceable or unliquidated, and the Tenth Circuit will invoke the 
exception only when the original amount is unliquidated. 
III. PRESLAR V. COMMISSIONER 
A. Facts 
In 1983, Layne Preslar and his wife, Sue, purchased a 2500 acre 
ranch near Cloudcroft, New Mexico for one million dollars.46 The 
Preslars financed the entire amount by executing a promissory note, 
secured by a mortgage on the ranch, in favor of Moncor Bank.47 The 
Preslars intended to develop part of the ranch by subdividing 160 
acres and selling one- or two-acre lots; the rest of the land was to be 
 
 39. See 916 F.2d 110, 116 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 40. See id. at 112. 
 41. See id. 
 42. See id. at 116. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See Preslar v. Commissioner, 167 F.3d 1323, 1328 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 45. Id. 
 46. See id. at 1325. 
 47. See id. 
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for hunting and other outdoor activities.48 The plan enjoyed some 
success, and the bank allowed the Preslars to pay their note install-
ments by assigning the sales contracts from lot purchasers to Moncor 
Bank at a discount.49 
In August 1985, Moncor Bank was declared insolvent, and the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) was appointed re-
ceiver and took over the bank’s operations.50 The FDIC refused to 
accept the assignment of sales contracts as payment on the Preslars’ 
note and ordered the Preslars to stop selling lots.51 The Preslars sued, 
claiming that the FDIC breached their contract. The parties settled 
out of court, with the FDIC agreeing to accept $350,000 in full sat-
isfaction for the Preslars’ debt.52 This represented a $449,463 reduc-
tion of the Preslars’ outstanding debt; they did not include this 
amount in their gross income.53 The IRS audited the Preslars and de-
termined that they had underreported their gross income by not in-
cluding the amount of the discharged debt.54 
The Preslars took their case to the United States Tax Court, 
claiming that they were exempt from including the amount in their 
gross income by 26 U.S.C. § 108(e)(5) (1994).55 The Tax Court ig-
nored the Preslars’ section 108 claim but ruled in their favor by in-
voking, sua sponte, the disputed debt exception.56 It held that the 
amount of the Preslars’ debt was not firmly established until the set-
tlement actually occurred; hence, they did not have any debt-
discharge income.57 The IRS appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.58 The Tenth Circuit overturned the Tax Court, holding 
that the Preslars did have to include the debt-discharge amount in  
 
 
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. at 1325–26. 
 52. See id. at 1326. 
 53. See id. 
 54. See id. 
 55. See id. Pursuant to § 108(e)(5), under certain circumstances a seller’s reduction of a 
buyer’s outstanding debt may be exempted from debt discharge income treatment. Though 
this section is an important caveat to the general rules of debt discharge income, it ultimately 
has no real bearing on this case or this note. 
 56. See id at 1326. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See id. 
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their gross income because the disputed-debt exception could not be 
applied to a liquidated debt.59 
B. Reasoning 
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the IRS and found that the 
amount of the Preslars’ debt discharge fell within the definition of 
gross income and, more specifically, within the scope of 26 U.S.C.  
§ 61(a)(12).60 The court then discussed both the free assets and sym-
metry rationales for the debt-discharge income rule. The court cited 
the Supreme Court case of Commissioner v. Tufts 61 and, without ex-
plicitly saying so, adopted the symmetry justification.62 
Moving to an analysis of the disputed-debt exception, the court 
stated that the exception “rests on the premise that if a taxpayer di-
putes the original amount of a debt . . . , a subsequent settlement of 
that dispute is ‘treated as the amount of debt cognizable for tax pur-
poses.’”63 The court also examined the seminal case of N. Sobel, Inc. 
v. Commissioner.64 It construed Sobel as allowing for nonrecognition 
because in that case the “corporation’s financial obligations could 
not be assessed . . . [because] the existence and amount were not 
fixed until the date of settlement.”65 This interpretation seems to re-
quire that the amount be unliquidated. 
The court then looked at Zarin and baldly stated that the Third 
Circuit incorrectly found that an unenforceable debt is unliqui-
dated.66 The Tenth Circuit held that treating liquidated and unliqui-
dated debts alike is incorrect because “[t]he whole theory behind re-
quiring that the amount of a debt be disputed before the contested 
liability exception can be triggered is that only in the context of dis-
puted debts is the . . . [IRS] unaware of the exact consideration ini-
 
 59. See id. at 1328. 
 60. See id. at 1333. 
 61. 461 U.S. 300 (1983). 
 62. See Preslar, 167 F.3d at 1327–29. 
 63. Id. at 1327 (quoting Zarin v. Commissioner, 916 F.2d 110, 115 (3d Cir. 1990)). 
Undoubtedly, the Third Circuit would feel that relying on Zarin for this proposition was, at 
least, disingenuous. The Tenth Circuit took a small quote out of context to support a proposi-
tion that Zarin explicitly rejects. See supra text accompanying notes 29–33. 
 64. See 40 B.T.A. 1263 (1939). 
 65. Preslar, 167 F.3d at 1328 (emphasis added). 
 66. See id. 
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tially exchanged in a transaction.”67 The court’s sole authority for 
this specific rationale was a single law review article.68 The article, in 
turn, relied on nothing; it suggested, in and of itself, that a taxpayer 
can utilize the disputed debt exception only when the IRS does not 
know the amount of debt initially excluded from gross income. In 
other words, this is merely an administrative requirement meant to 
allow the IRS to simplify its auditing processes so that it does not 
have to investigate every unliquidated debt.69 It seems that the court 
was, on its own, creating a new justification for the debt-discharge 
rule. 
However, the court immediately solidified its position by also 
adopting the established symmetry rationale. The court stated that, 
“‘[i]f the parties initially treated the transaction as a loan when the 
proceeds were received, thereby not declaring the receipt as income, 
then the transaction should be treated consistently when the loan is 
discharged and income should be declared in the amount of the dis-
charge.’”70 The court, somewhat secondarily, added that this symme-
try rationale is “underscored” by Tufts because the Supreme Court 
found that if “indebtedness is treated as a true debt when . . . in-
curred, it must be treated as a true debt when . . . discharged.”71 The 
court further reasoned that “if the distinction between the recourse 
and nonrecourse nature of a loan has no bearing on calculation of 
gross income, the enforceability of a debt should be of equally 
minimal importance.”72 The court seemed to minimize this justifica-
tion; however, since this is the only place where the court solidly re-
lied on any precedent; this was really the heart of the court’s reason-
ing. 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. See id. (relying on Shaviro, supra note 11, at 256). 
 69. See Shaviro, supra note 11, at 256. This is not to suggest that the IRS cannot, or 
should not, make rules based on administrative decisions. See Haverly v. United States, 513 
F.2d 224, 227 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding that “[i]t is not for the courts to quarrel with. . .[the 
IRS’s] rational allocation of its administrative resources”). This is merely pointing out that the 
Tenth Circuit, so cavalier in shooting down its sister circuit, is here apparently relying not on 
established precedent or authority but merely on a proposed justification from a law review 
article. 
 70. Preslar, 167 F.3d at 1329 (quoting Giangiordano, supra note 22, at 1200 n.88). 
The court also relied on Glenshaw for this proposition by stating that any other interpretation 
(i.e., the free assets rationale) would “disavow the Supreme Court’s mandate that the phrase 
‘gross income’ be interpreted as broadly as the Constitution permits.” Id. 
 71. Id. (relying on Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 311–13 (1983)). 
 72. Id. 
9POM-FIN.DOC 12/9/00  1:43 PM 
1677] Preslar v. Commissioner 
 1687 
The court went on to undercut Zarin’s reliance on one of the 
Tenth Circuit’s cases. Zarin relied on United States v. Hall, a gam-
bling debt case remarkably similar to Zarin.73 In Hall, the Tenth 
Circuit found that the taxpayer did not have income when he settled 
a gambling debt for less than its “face” amount because the debt, 
“being unenforceable . . . [did] not meet the requirements of debt 
necessary to justify the . . . operation of general rules of tax law relat-
ing to cancellation of debt.”74 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that 
Hall’s emphasis on unenforceability made the case questionable in 
light of Tufts, and, even if Hall were still good law, Zarin’s reliance 
was misplaced because the debt in Hall was unliquidated. Even in 
Hall, the symmetry rationale, not the freed assets approach, under-
lies the decision. 
The court then moved to the specific facts of Preslar, holding 
that the Tax Court had incorrectly found the amount of the Preslars’ 
debt unliquidated. The Tenth Circuit found no evidence to support 
the Preslars’ contention that the amount of the debt was in dispute. 
The court reasoned that, since there was no competent evidence 
showing that the FDIC had to observe the previous creditor’s prac-
tice of accepting assignment of sales contracts as payment on their 
note, there was no good faith disagreement over how much the note 
was worth. The court continued that, even if there were a good faith 
disagreement, the disagreement pertained only to the terms of re-
payment not to the actual amount of the debt. There being no evi-
dence of a good faith dispute over the amount of the debt, the dis-
puted-debt exception could not be invoked to surpass the debt-
discharge income rule.75 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Preslar court got the law right, but it came to the wrong 
conclusion only because it incorrectly applied the law to the facts. 
The Tenth Circuit was right about applying the disputed-debt excep-
tion because it correctly analyzed and applied the underlying debt-
discharge income rule. The Third Circuit, on the other hand, was 
wrong because it incorrectly construed the underlying tax law too 
broadly. 
 
 73. United States v. Hall, 307 F.2d 238 (10th Cir. 1962). 
 74. Id. at 241. 
 75. See Preslar, 167 F.3d at 1330–31. 
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A. Reasoning Behind the Debt-Discharge Income Rule 
Intuitively, it seems clear that taxpayers should have to include 
debt-discharge in gross income. If someone were to work as a park-
ing attendant, save up $5000 and buy a new car with the money, she 
would have effectively been taxed on the consumption that the car 
represents because she had to pay taxes on the $5000 when she 
earned it.76 Similarly, if someone were to borrow $5000 from an off-
shore bank and buy a car, he would effectively have to pay taxes on 
the consumption the car represents because he would have to repay 
the debt with after-tax dollars. If, however, the off-shore bank were 
to go bankrupt and forgive the borrower’s debt, he would have 
$5000 of consumption (through the purchase of the car), but he 
would have it tax-free because he would no longer have to repay the 
debt with after-tax dollars. This seems unfair. The concept of debt-
discharge income addresses this concern. As stated above, the rea-
soning behind this judicially created rule of income has changed 
since its first inception.77 This change is important to the Preslar 
case, and to the circuit split it recognizes, because a rule’s reasoning 
should directly affect how courts construe and apply any exceptions 
to that rule. 
1. Freeing assets 
The first justification for the debt-discharge rule, established in 
Kirby Lumber, was the freeing assets construct.78 Under this ap-
proach, debt-discharge income constituted part of a taxpayer’s gross 
income when a creditor discharged a debt, thereby freeing some as-
set of the debtor. This makes sense because, as in the above example, 
we do not want some people, through sheer luck, to enjoy consump-
tion tax-free while others pay taxes on identical consumption. This 
approach feels equitable because it appears to take care of what 
seems unfair: by taxing people when an asset is freed through loan-
forgiveness, the IRS ensures that those taxpayers do not arbitrarily 
receive tax-free consumption. 
 
 
 
 76. See 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(1) (1994). 
 77. See supra text accompanying notes 15–23. 
 78. See United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931). 
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As previously stated, the Supreme Court created the freed assets 
justification in United States v. Kirby Lumber.79 This justification, 
however, arises entirely from one sentence of dicta.80 The Court 
cited no cases, statutes, legislative history, or anything else for this 
proposition; it seemed to rely only on the apparent fairness of the 
idea. That is not to say that, because it was “only” Supreme Court 
dicta, it had no effect. Indeed, until some superseding Court reason-
ing came along, it was the controlling rationale, and all courts should 
have bound themselves to defining debt-discharge income in accor-
dance with the Court’s stated justification. Superseding dicta did, 
however, come along in Tufts.81 
2. Symmetry 
As already described, Tufts abandoned the freed assets ap-
proach.82 The Supreme Court did so by ignoring whether the dis-
charge freed the taxpayer’s assets from obligations (or even the ques-
tion of whether the taxpayer had economic incentive to honor the 
obligation)83 and instead focusing on whether an untaxed discharge 
transaction would mean that “the mortgagor effectively will have re-
ceived untaxed income at the time the loan was extended.”84 
This was the birth of symmetry because the Court cared only 
about the debt money that was received on the front end of the 
transaction; that is, the amount that needs to be taxed on the back 
end of the transaction (if, of course, it is discharged). For example, 
assume Jack borrows $10,000. He and his creditor reach some kind 
of arrangement where Jack is personally liable for only $7000. Before 
 
 79. See id. at 1. 
 80. See id. 
 81. See Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983). 
 82. See supra Part II.B. 
 83. Previously, a nonrecourse mortgage was included in income because the Court as-
sumed that the taxpayer would repay the debt with after-tax dollars. The logic of this assump-
tion, though, applied only when the market value of the underlying asset exceeded the amount 
of the mortgage (because only then would the taxpayer have the rational incentive to actually 
pay the debt instead of allowing it to lapse and the creditor to take an asset worth more than 
the debt). The Court specifically left open the question of whether the taxpayer would have to 
include the discharged amount of the nonrecourse mortgage in gross income when the 
amount of the debt exceeded the fair market value of the underlying property (thereby leaving 
a rational seller with no incentive to repay the debt). See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 
14 (1947); DODGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 158–60. 
 84. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 310. 
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the debt comes due, Jack’s creditor permanently leaves the country, 
effectively discharging Jack’s debt. Under the freed assets approach, 
Jack realizes $7000 of debt discharge income because it is only to 
that extent that his assets were encumbered (by his personal obliga-
tion). Under the symmetry analysis, though, all that matters is the 
amount that Jack initially received. The focus is on ensuring that, in 
the end, Jack is taxed on the amount that he received in the begin-
ning. 
Though the factual context of Tufts may have differed from the 
normal debt-discharge income scenario, the Court’s reasoning was 
broad enough to encompass all debt-discharge income.85 When one 
gets rid of debt, the Court simply asks whether or not the taxpayer is 
receiving an unwarranted accession to wealth because the IRS did 
not tax the amount in the beginning since it thought at the time that 
the taxpayer was obligated to repay the debt. 
One may counter that Tufts does not extend this far by claiming 
that a nonrecourse mortgage is indeed enforceable to some extent.86 
However, the Supreme Court, in Tufts, did not say that the seller re-
alized gain only to the extent that the seller had some liability in the 
property. On the contrary, the Court specifically held that it does 
not matter whether the “amount of the nonrecourse mortgage ex-
ceeds the value of the property transferred.”87 The seller realizes 
gross income to the full extent of the mortgage, no matter to what 
extent it is enforceable against him. This specific reasoning, along 
 
 85. One weakness in this theory is found in footnote 11. Here, the Court stated that 
“[w]e are not presented with and do not decide the contours of the cancellation-of-
indebtedness doctrine. We note only that our approach does not fall within certain prior inter-
pretations of that doctrine.” 461 U.S. at 311 n.11. This language seems to constrain the sym-
metry approach to the particular issue of treatment of nonrecourse debt, precluding application 
to the general principle of debt-discharge income. However, this language applied to how the 
competing rationales relate to the application and characterization of basis. See Rev. Rul. 91-
31; DODGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 176. Indeed, symmetry is today accepted as the sole ra-
tionale for debt discharge. See DODGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 136. 
 86. See Preslar v. Commissioner, 167 F.3d 1323, 1336 (10th Cir. 1999) (Ebel, J., dis-
senting) (“[T]he only way Tufts’ holding ‘underscores’ the majority’s holding is if a nonre-
course loan is treated as the functional equivalent of an unenforceable debt.”). Judge Ebel 
stated that, though a taxpayer has no personal liability on a nonrecourse mortgage, the tax-
payer still has liability to the extent of the underlying security interest. He then contended that, 
since there is some liability involved with a nonrecourse mortgage, Tufts is constrained to a 
nonrecourse mortgage and cannot be extended to a completely unenforceable debt. See id. at 
1336–37. 
 87. Tufts, 461 U.S. at 307. 
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with the Court’s rather explicit dicta,88 strongly suggests that the 
Court has adopted the symmetry rationale without qualification.89 
 
B. Debt-Discharge Income Reasoning and Its Effect on the Disputed-
Debt Exception 
1. Application of the disputed-debt exception under the freed assets 
rationale 
If freeing assets is the test for whether a discharged debt is in-
cluded in gross income, courts should interpret the disputed-debt 
exception more broadly by extending the exception to situations 
where the parties dispute the enforceability, as well as the amount, of 
a debt. The exception should extend this far because such a dispute 
centers around that which would make the discharged debt income: 
if the debt is truly unenforceable, the debt-discharge frees no assets 
and no gross income results. The taxpayer would not have to include 
this discharge because the debt never encumbered any assets. So, if a 
creditor were to forgive a loan, the taxpayer would not have to in-
clude the discharged amount in income if he could argue that the 
loan was unenforceable.90 
2. Application of the disputed-debt exception under the symmetry 
rationale 
Under symmetry, a court is concerned with how much benefit 
the debtor originally received (the front end of the loan) rather than 
how much the debt is actually worth to the debtor.91 This theory is 
an administrative one; the only reason to allow the dispute to affect 
 
 88. See supra text accompanying notes 70-72. 
 89. Indeed, most today regard symmetry as the sole justification for the concept of 
debt-discharge income. See DODGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 136. 
 90. See supra Part II.B. Just how clear unenforceability must be may depend on the 
situation. As noted above, the Court found that where there was economic incentive to repay 
the debt was “enforceable” enough that its discharge would free assets. Exactly how far the 
Court would be willing to extend this “virtual” enforceability (i.e., moral incentive, social in-
centive, etc.) is unclear. What is important, though, is that under the “free assets” rationale the 
Court would, at some point, allow a question about unenforceability (completely apart from 
amount) to render debt discharge non-includable. 
 91. See Giangiordano, supra note 22, at 1201; Shaviro, supra note 11, at 242–43; supra 
Part II.B. 
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whether the discharge is included in gross income is because, where 
the parties themselves are unsure of the amount, the IRS also must 
be “unaware of the exact consideration initially exchanged in a trans-
action.”92 
At first glance, it may seem that symmetry is merely doing the 
same thing that the freed assets rationale does. By allowing a tax-
payer to not include a debt-discharge because the parties to the 
transaction dispute the debt, the court is allowing them to deter-
mine, after the fact, what the debt is worth (or, in other words, what 
assets are really being freed). However, symmetry is different because 
it focuses on error-correction. The IRS taxes according to the par-
ties’ settlement, not because it cares what the parties think the debt 
is really worth (the assets they think it truly freed), but because the 
settlement is the only proxy the IRS has to determine how much the 
IRS had initially allowed the debtor to exclude from income. 
An error-correction focus precludes the IRS from allowing de-
ductions for disputes over enforceability. They do not care if the 
debt is enforceable because that does not affect the amount initially 
received and excluded. Likewise, the IRS does not really care that 
the parties do not agree on the original amount of debt. This figure, 
again, goes only to determining how much of the taxpayer’s asset 
base the debt discharge freed. 
Discharged debt, however, requires the IRS to take notice of the 
amount. If the service does not know how much the taxpayer ini-
tially excluded from gross income, it cannot levy a correct tax (in the 
same sense that the service, under the freed assets approach, could 
not equitably assess tax if the debt were not conclusively enforce-
able). In this case, the IRS has made a distinct choice; it has chosen 
to not get involved in the determination of the initial amount of the 
debt. Instead, it allows the parties to decide for themselves (through 
settlement or court process). The IRS essentially forgoes the tax 
revenue because, administratively, the effort to determine the 
amount of discharged debt would exceed the benefit.93 
C. The Difference Between Preslar and Zarin 
In Preslar, the Tenth Circuit recognized a distinct circuit split 
over the treatment of liquidated debts for the purpose of the dis-
 
 92. Preslar, 167 F.3d at 1328. 
 93. See Zarin v. Commissioner, 916 F.2d 110, 115–16 (3d Cir. 1990). 
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puted-debt exception when it stated that “[t]he problem with the 
Third Circuit’s holding is it treats liquidated and unliquidated debts 
alike.”94 The Third Circuit held that a debt certain as to amount and 
questionable only as to legal enforceability, when settled, was ex-
cluded from gross income by the debt-discharge exception.95 The 
Tenth Circuit explicitly required a debt to be unliquidated before the 
exception can apply.96 
At first glance, it may seem that Zarin differs from Preslar in 
only a semantic way. After all, the Third Circuit, instead of explicitly 
holding that a taxpayer can invoke the disputed debt exception and 
exclude debt-discharge when the debt is disputed only as to amount, 
stated that “[w]hen a debt is unenforceable, it follows that the 
amount of the debt, and not just the liability thereon, is in dis-
pute.”97 Seemingly, the court only said that the term “enforceability” 
necessarily connotes “amount.” Similarly, the reasoning and the split 
may appear based on the timing of valuation of consumption. The 
Third Circuit, by allowing a liquidated debt to qualify under the ex-
ception, seemed to allow parties to decide what the value of con-
sumption “really” was at the time of purchase.98 
Neither of these rationales explains the true difference between 
Zarin and Preslar.99 To understand what the Zarin court was actu-
ally doing and where the split truly comes from, one must go deeper 
into the case. What Zarin did was look at the disputed-debt excep-
tion in light of the freed assets rationale. The court allowed the after-
 
 94. Preslar, 167 F.3d at 1328. 
 95. See Zarin, 916 F.2d at 116. 
 96. See Preslar, 167 F.3d at 1328. 
 97. Zarin, 916 F.2d at 116. 
 98. See Shaviro, supra note 11, at 223–39. This ex post facto valuation is a corrupt 
method of valuing consumption. Shaviro points out that, under our current system, we assign 
a cost basis to consumption. A person is taxed on his consumption based on how much he paid 
for it, not his real psychic value. This reason, though perhaps not ideologically pure, is the ac-
knowledged mode of performance for a number of reasons. 
 99. The court, somewhat disingenuously, made a couple of stabs at the proposition that 
all it was really doing was holding that enforceability connotes amount. For example, the court 
stated that “[i]f indeed the only issue was the enforceability of the entire debt, there would 
have been no settlement. Zarin would have owed all or nothing.” Zarin, 916 F.2d at 116. 
This concept plainly ignores, though, the fact that a purely rational person, realizing that the 
debt was unenforceable, would refuse to pay the amount he originally had agreed to (assuming 
he originally assumed the debt enforceable). Even if he agreed as to the amount initially ac-
quired, he would rationally push his advantage and drive a bargain for less than the initial 
amount. See Shaviro, supra, note 11, at 256. 
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the-fact debt valuation because it focused on the concept of asset 
worth—it wanted to know how much, in Zarin’s current assets, the 
debt really represented at the time of purchase. This is what Sobel (a 
case the Third Circuit heavily relied on) did; it asked how much the 
original debt “really” was.100 The Third Circuit, shadowing this rea-
soning, searched for an answer to that question: how much was the 
original debt really worth? Since acknowledging that the more one 
has lost the more one has consumed seems odd and counter-
intuitive;101 the court refused to stop at the standard cost-based ap-
proach. It allowed the parties to assign a value after they had con-
cluded that the debt was legally unenforceable. If the court had used 
the symmetry approach it would not have concerned itself with the 
actual value to the taxpayer; it would have coldly asked how much 
the parties initially excluded—that is the amount that had to be in-
cluded in gross income.102 
That the court relied on the freed assets approach becomes still 
more apparent when one looks at the reasoning of the court. The 
Third Circuit drew primarily from Sobel. That case, decided before 
Tufts, relied on the freed assets justification when it analyzed 
whether the debt there in question qualified under the disputed-debt 
exception.103 Indeed, the Third Circuit actually quoted freed assets 
language from Sobel.104 Additionally, the court cited a Tenth Circuit 
case, United States v. Hall, which the court construed as supporting 
 
 100. See N. Sobel, Inc. v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 1263 (1939). 
 101. See Zarin v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1084, 1101 (1989) (Tannenwald, J., dissent-
ing). 
 102. Admittedly, here as well, the court could focus on the value of what was initially 
excluded rather than on the amount. However, it is much more detached for a court to cleanly 
ask how much cost-basis did the party originally receive when that question is the end of the 
analysis—that is all we are concerned with. Yet, when a court focuses on how much of the tax-
payer’s asset base the discharge freed (in essence equating current assets with the value of the 
debt), the court has difficulty acknowledging that the more one loses at a socially disapproved-
of activity (like gambling), the more he should be taxed. See Zarin, 92 T.C. at 1101 (Tannen-
wald, J., dissenting) (decrying “the incongruous result that the more a gambler loses, the . . . 
larger the increase in his wealth”); Shaviro, supra note 11, at 235. If the Third Circuit, in Za-
rin, had focused on the cold reality of balancing off-setting amounts, raising taxes proportion-
ally to a rising amount of gambling losses would not have troubled them. They certainly would 
not have been so troubled that they would abandon the standard ex ante cost valuation in fa-
vor of a subjective ex post facto valuation. 
 103. See Zarin, 40 B.T.A. 1263. 
 104. See Zarin, 916 F.2d at 115 (“[T]he Board held that the portion of the note forgiven 
by the bank ‘was not the occasion for a freeing of assets and that there was no gain . . . .’” 
(quoting Zarin, 40 B.T.A. at 1265)). 
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the freed assets rationale.105 In Hall, the Tenth Circuit ruled on a 
gambling case “factually similar to [Zarin].”106 There, the Tenth 
Circuit seemed to hold “that because the debt was unenforceable, 
the amount of the loss and resulting debt cognizable for tax pur-
poses were fixed by the settlement . . . .”107 Again, the court looked 
at authority that applied the disputed-debt exception to a situation 
where debt-discharge income was based upon the freed assets ap-
proach. 
So, the Third Circuit looked at these two freed assets cases and 
then allowed a debt, disputed only as to enforceability, to qualify 
under the disputed-debt exception. However, rather than explicitly 
stating that they were allowing taxpayers to except liquidated debts, 
the court rejected the Commissioner’s arguments and authorities 
and, with no prior authority, stated that the question of amount is 
necessarily involved in the question of enforceability.108 The only ex-
planation for this is that the court had implicitly adopted a freed as-
sets justification but did not want to explicitly say so, in light of the 
fact that Tufts had probably overruled that justification.109 
Preslar, on the other hand, cleanly applied the symmetry justifi-
cation to the debt-discharge exception and, as such, held that the 
disputed-debt exception applies only when the amount of the debt is 
unliquidated.110 In essence, the court found that the “whole theory 
 
 105. See Zarin, 916 F.2d at 115–16. 
 106. Id. at 115. 
 107. Id. It should not surprise the reader to know that the Tenth Circuit, in Preslar, ex-
plicitly questioned the Zarin court’s reliance on Hall. In addition to questioning Hall ’ s  “con-
tinued viability . . . in light of. . . Tufts,” the court argued that the taxpayer in Hall qualified 
for the disputed-debt exception because the debt was unliquidated, not because the debt was 
unenforceable. Preslar, 167 F.3d at 1329. 
 108. See Zarin, 916 F.2d at 116. 
 109. Again, the reason that the freed assets justification influenced the court is not that it 
forced the court to allow the parties to go back and assign a “real” value to the actual amount 
of consumption; one could just as easily argue that under the symmetry justification, a court 
should be interested in error-correction only as to the “real” value that was first received. If 
one starts, though, by realizing: (1) that Zarin stated that unenforceability always means that 
the amount of the debt is questionable and (2) that this proposition is clearly not true, one 
must ask himself why Zarin makes this leap. That the court focused on the freed assets justifi-
cation explains this behavior. Since this approach is more sensitive to what the initial consump-
tion was really worth (i.e., a person would not encumber his assets unless he had some set 
value in mind), the court is more willing to allow parties to go back and re-decide how much 
things were worth if the transaction seems odd to the court. Also, the fact that Zarin only cited 
freed assets cases suggests that this is indeed the rationale the court was implicitly adopting. 
 110. See Preslar, 167 F.3d at 1328–29. 
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behind requiring that the amount of a debt be disputed before the 
contested liability exception can be triggered is that only in . . . [this 
context is] the . . . [IRS] unaware of the exact consideration initially 
exchanged in a transaction.”111 For this blunt proposition, the court 
relied wholly on only one law review article.112 The proposition, 
though, was “underscored by the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Tufts.”113 Having adopted the symmetry justification, the court di-
rectly disallowed the disputed-debt exception to apply to the Preslar 
debt because it was disputed only as to enforceability. 
The circuit split really comes down to what justification the court 
is using. The Third Circuit focused on the freed assets approach (go-
ing through some questionable legal and semantic gymnastics to al-
low an unenforceable debt to qualify). The Tenth Circuit, on the 
other hand, concentrated on the symmetry justification; as such, any 
debt with a liquidated amount cannot qualify for the disputed-debt 
exception. So, deciding which circuit is right means deciding which 
justification is right. 
D. Symmetry—The Correct Rationale 
The Preslar court was right because it used the correct justifica-
tion for the debt-discharge concept. Though the judicial concept of 
debt-discharge income started with the explicit justification of freed 
assets114 and never really expressly moved to the justification of sym-
metry,115 this reasoning better comports with the modern judicial 
concept of the broader definition of gross income.116 It also just 
makes better sense. 
Recall that the modern conceptualization of gross income arises 
primarily from the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Glenshaw.117 The 
Court held that Congress, in creating the federal income tax, in-
 
 111. Id. at 1328. 
 112. See Shaviro, supra note 11. 
 113. Preslar, 167 F.3d at 1329. 
 114. It is true that Congress later codified the disputed-debt exception at 26 U.S.C  
§ 61(a)(12) (1994), but this codification did not include a rationale. Presumably, Congress 
was satisfied enough with the Supreme Court’s argument in United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 
284 U.S. 1 (1931) that it did not change the reasoning when creating the law. 
 115. See Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 300 n.11 (1983). 
 116. See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955). 
 117. See supra Part II. 
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tended to paint an extremely wide stroke.118 Basically, taxpayers must 
include in gross income everything they receive unless a specific pro-
vision of the I.R.C. explicitly allows a deduction.119 
Symmetry comports with Glenshaw better than freed assets does 
because, by taking into account all debt proceeds originally received 
and not initially included in gross income, it reaches more of a tax-
payer’s consumption. Freed assets, on the other hand, excepts any 
unenforceable debt, and “[section] 61(a) of the Code, which taxes 
all accessions to wealth ‘from whatever source derived,’ clearly does 
not sanction such a result.”120 The freed assets approach is, in reality, 
a deduction—a deduction not explicitly laid out in the I.R.C. In ad-
dition to this, the plain fact that symmetry pulls more money into 
the tax base shows that it is more in line with Glenshaw.121 Symme-
try’s broad grasp of everything capable of reasonable ascertainment 
fits in with this better than does the self-limiting reach of the freed 
assets approach. 
Glenshaw also supports symmetry in a more implicit way. Glen-
shaw overruled an earlier definition of income that based gross in-
come inclusion on the source of the income.122 This earlier decision, 
Eisner v. Macomber, stated that “‘[i]ncome may be defined as . . . de-
rived from capital, from labor, or from both combined,’ provided it 
be understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion 
of capital assets.”123 It is clear that Glenshaw destroyed this source-
based treatment.124 The freed assets approach is reminiscent of this 
kind of treatment because it asks the source of the income—that is, 
does it come from a specific type of loan (one that encumbers a per-
son’s assets). Symmetry, by ignoring the source altogether and only 
asking the amount of the debt (from whatever source), is much more 
in alignment with Glenshaw’s implicit overruling of the source-based 
definition of gross income of Eisner. 
 
 118. See Glenshaw, 348 U.S. at 426. 
 119. See DODGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 41. 
 120. Giangiordano, supra note 22, at 1200 (quoting 26 U.S.C § 61(a)(12)). The article 
also relies on the Glenshaw case for this proposition. 
 121. See Glenshaw, 348 U.S. at 429 (“[The I.R.C.] was used by Congress to exert . . . 
‘the full measure of its taxing power.’” (quoting Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 
(1940))). 
 122. See DODGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 62. 
 123. 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920) (quoting Stratton’s Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 
399, 415 (1913); Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185 (6th Cir. 1918)). 
 124. See DODGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 62. 
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Preslar’s symmetry reasoning logically flows from Glenshaw. The 
Glenshaw court found that Congress intended to “tax all gains ex-
cept those specifically exempted.”125 The freed assets approach artifi-
cially carves out an exemption. The symmetry rationale, in contrast, 
applies the exception only when it is truly necessary126—only when 
the IRS does not know the actual amount of the debt. That is, the 
service wants to tax everything possible, but the only reason they do 
not is because they do not know the actual amount initially excluded 
from gross income (not because of a contrived reason like not know-
ing how much of the taxpayer’s assets were actually encumbered by 
the debt).127 
Another indication that the symmetry approach has been 
adopted is Congress’s treatment of the freed assets approach. Under 
the earlier approach, debtors did not recognize income if they were 
insolvent.128 This resulted in the fact that a debtor, being obligated 
to include debt-discharge income only to the extent of freed assets, 
was immune from recognizing income if he was insolvent. On the 
other hand, if he were only minimally solvent, he had to recognize 
income only to the extent that assets exceeded liabilities (since you 
can only free assets that you have).129 This rationale, however, “must 
have been regarded as flawed by Congress, for Congress preempted 
the common-law rule by enacting § 108(b), which provides that the 
insolvent debtor is . . . taxed on the debt-discharge income.”130 That 
Congress felt the freed assets approach so flawed as to need legisla-
tive rectification militates in favor of enforcing a different regime—
symmetry. 
Symmetry is also better in the sense that it treats all taxpayers the 
same. The freed assets approach allows one taxpayer, fortunate 
enough to incur unenforceable debt, to enjoy consumption tax free 
 
 125. Glenshaw, 348 U.S. at 430. 
 126. Granted, the judiciary can carve out exceptions to laws when it deems it necessary 
for a proper construction of the law. However, when choosing between two possible rationales 
for an exception, it makes sense to choose that which complies with other, previous construc-
tions of the underlying law. 
 127. See Giangiordano, supra note 22, at 1200; Shaviro, supra note 11, at 256. The 
Tenth Circuit actually relied primarily on the Shaviro article for this proposition; however, even 
though there was no previous explicit authority, it is a well-reasoned and persuasive approach 
to prior statutory and case law. 
 128. See DODGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 136. 
 129. See id. at 135–36. 
 130. Id. at 136. 
9POM-FIN.DOC 12/9/00  1:43 PM 
1677] Preslar v. Commissioner 
 1699 
(or partially tax-free), where another taxpayer will have to pay for the 
identical consumption in after-tax dollars.131 This is yet another way 
that the freed assets approach is incompatible with how Congress has 
chosen to tax us and how the Supreme Court has chosen to interpret 
tax law. Income tax laws should be interpreted broadly, giving ex-
ceptions only where they have been explicitly carved out. 
E. The Right Rule the Wrong Way 
The Tenth Circuit adopted the right justification for disputed-
debt income. It decided to look at the debt and hold that, if it were 
liquidated (enforceable or not), the Preslars would have to include 
any debt-discharge amount in gross income. The court, however, in-
correctly ruled that the Preslars’ debt was liquidated. 
Under the Preslars’ original debt arrangement, Moncor Bank al-
lowed them to repay their loan by assigning sales contracts to the 
bank at a discount rate.132 Later, when the FDIC became receiver for 
the bank, the FDIC refused to allow that method of payment on the 
note.133 The Preslars claimed, and the Tax Court agreed, that the 
original amount of debt had been inflated and that they had ac-
cepted this inflated amount only because the bank had agreed to the 
unique arrangement of repayment.134 
In other words, the Preslars claimed that the debt was unliqui-
dated because there was a dispute over the method of repayment. 
The Tenth Circuit disagreed. The court stated that the Preslars had 
presented no “competent evidence to support their theory that their 
loan obligation was linked to the repayment scheme”135 and that 
“the Preslars’ underlying indebtedness remained liquidated at all 
times.”136 
This logic seems clear at first glance—the way a debt is paid does 
not affect the actual amount of the debt. This decision, though, ig-
nores a number of economic realities. A debt can be unliquidated, 
even though the parties agree on the original amount, because the 
method of repayment can affect how much the debt is actually 
 
 131. See Giangiordano, supra note 22, at 1201. 
 132. See Preslar v. Commissioner, 167 F.3d 1323, 1325 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 133. See id. 
 134. See id. at 1329. 
 135. Id. at 1330. 
 136. Id. 
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worth. Many different aspects of the method of repayment could af-
fect the actual cash value of the debt. That the bank willingly as-
sumed the contracts meant that they lost the time value of money; 
the Preslars received credit for the payment now, whereas the bank 
did not receive the cash for an extended period of time.137 Also, the 
assumption of the contracts meant that the bank assumed the risk 
and hassle of collecting on them—another factor that would decrease 
the value of the actual assignment. 
This meant that, though the parties attached a certain amount to 
the initial note, the value of the debt initially received, and not in-
cluded in gross income, actually depended on the method of repay-
ment.138 This is not a startling idea, and, indeed, the Tenth Circuit 
seemed to agree that this was possible when it stated that “[i]t is 
conceivable that two parties could negotiate a loan transaction in 
which the underlying amount of a debt is tied to the existence or 
nonexistence of some post-execution event.”139 The court erred on 
the side of caution and adopted too narrow a view of when a debt is 
liquidated. The court should have taken into account the repayment 
methods of which the parties initially conceived, methods that affect 
how much the Preslars originally excluded from their gross in-
come.140 
The court’s other problem, that of evidence, is wholly misplaced. 
The court went out of its way and overturned the lower court’s find-
 
 137. Time value of money is an extraordinarily important aspect of finance. It is, in es-
sence, what interest is all about: people pay interest for the right to use another’s money. De-
pending on a number of factors, the fact that the bank assumed the Preslars’ contracts for fu-
ture money and credited their loan amount presently could have been worth hundreds of 
thousands of dollars to the Preslars. 
 138. Though this seems similar to the ex post facto valuation that Zarin incorrectly con-
doned, it differs with regards to timing. The taxpayer is not going back, after the fact, and 
claiming that the value of a sum-certain debt was actually less than what he actually agreed to 
repay. Here, the taxpayer is claiming that the agreement initially included terms that initially 
made the debt worth less. This means that the parties are actually disagreeing as to the initial 
amount of the loan. 
 139. Preslar, 167 F.3d at 1329–30. Possibly, what the Tenth Circuit meant by this was 
that the amount of a loan could be tied to a subsequent event when the exact amount of the 
original debt is not expressly specified. For example, John owes one-half of what his mother 
leaves him upon her death (his mother is still alive). However, these words are also susceptible 
to the interpretation that the value of the amount of the debt, though the amount is specifi-
cally set, can vary according to how the method of repayment plays out (i.e., how successful 
the Preslars are in selling contracts to assign to the bank). 
 140. This makes sense if one supposes that the Preslars would not have agreed initially to 
assume one million dollars of debt had not the special method of repayment existed. 
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ing as to the evidence.141 Though it adopted the correct mode of 
analysis, it fed that analysis with incorrect facts by disallowing the 
lower court’s findings in favor of its own. As the dissent correctly 
pointed out, “the majority overlook[ed] significant evidence in the 
record as well as the high standard of clear error for overturning the 
[lower court’s] factual finding.”142 The Tenth Circuit should have 
found that the method of payment can affect the amount of the 
debt; that, as such, a dispute as to method can be a dispute as to 
amount; and that, following the Tax Court’s factual findings, the 
Preslars had a legitimate dispute as to method and, hence, amount. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Preslar court correctly disagreed with the 
Third Circuit’s holding in Zarin and held that the disputed-debt ex-
ception applies only to debts with unliquidated amounts. The court 
did so because it recognized that the rationale for debt-discharge in-
come has changed since its first inception. Because this rationale has 
changed from freed assets to symmetry, a debt-discharge should not 
be excluded from gross income when it is disputed only as to en-
forceability. The only reason to exclude is that the parties dispute the 
amount of the debt and it cannot be known for certain; hence, the 
IRS does not know how much was initially excluded from gross in-
come.143 
However, having adopted the correct rationale and exception 
construction, the court promptly misapplied it. The court incorrectly 
held that the method of repayment did not affect the initial amount 
of the loan and that, even if it did, there was no evidence in this case 
that their loan was linked to a unique repayment method. The court 
should have recognized that the method of repayment can indeed 
affect the initial value of a loan. The court also should have respected 
the lower court’s finding that, in this case, the parties did indeed dis-
 
 141. See Preslar, 167 F.3d at 1330. 
 142. Id. at 1334 (Ebel, J., dissenting) (relying on 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1) (1994) and 
Exxon Corp. v. Gann, 21 F.3d 1002 (10th Cir. 1994)). 
 143. This conclusion should not be over-emphasized to completely crowd out the signifi-
cance of unenforceability. It is clearly conceivable that the unenforceability of a debt could cast 
legitimate doubt on the true amount of the debt. If the unenforceability of the debt makes a 
court believe that the parties never really agreed on a set amount, the disputed debt exception 
should apply. The point of this Note is that when the parties dispute only the enforceability, 
the amount being completely clear, the disputed debt exception should not apply. 
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agree, in good faith, over the method. In sum, the court incorrectly 
applied the correct doctrine and came to an incorrect conclusion. 
Chad J. Pomeroy 
 
